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Abstract  Central to Vygotsky’s theory of language acquisition, the paper claims, is his 
complex  notion  of  ‘thought’    straddling  as  it  does  mental  events  from  pre-predicative 
thinking to the full social conceptuality of modern culture. In support of this reading the 
paper foregrounds two features in Vygotsky’s theory, his social gradualism, characterized by 
his emphasis on historical cultural processes, and the prominence in his argument of mental 
resemblance relations in the development of the child’s mastery of meaning. Vygotsky is 
shown to defend the position that there is an important link between nonverbal cognition and 
language, between perception and word. This, the paper argues, makes Vygotsky’s enterprise 
compatible with a semantics of imaginability, a claim backed up by his observation that in 
language it is the imaginary apple rather than the real one that is decisive. As a psychological 
system, the imagination certainly plays a crucial role in one of Vygotsky’s central concerns: 
concept formation from syncretism via endophasy towards mature conceptuality. The paper 
concludes with Vygotsky’s view of linguistic meaning as generalized reflection of reality in 
contrast to definitional conceptions which sever the concept from its ‘natural connections’.  
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syncretism;  endophasy;    pseudoconcept;  generalized  reflection  of  reality;  semantics  of 
imaginability. 
1. Introduction 
Unlike the Fregean tradition up to hyperintensional semantics (Frege 1970 [1892]; 
Montague 1970; 1974; Duzi et al. 2010), which eliminated imaginability from sense 
as a remnant of a misleading psychologism, Vygotsky takes the opposite route by 
demonstrating the indispensable role Vorstellung plays in language learning. Unlike 
Wittgenstein (2005: §6), who accounts for Vorstellung only to liken its function to 
incidental tunes produced on the keyboard of the imagination, Vygotsky shows how 
verbal meaning emerges out of imaginability, in phylogenesis as in ontogenesis. And 
unlike  the  early  Chomsky  (1957),  whose  syntactic  analysis  takes  meaning  for 
granted, in Vygotsky grammar supervenes on meaning. At the centre of Vygotsky’s 
language acquisition program is the umbrella notion of ‘thought’. 
‘Thought’  straddles  a  broad  spectrum  of  human  mental  activity  from  pre-verbal 
thinking in hominids and children to full conceptuality in contemporary society. As 
such,  ‘thought’  has  a  trajectory  from  nonverbal,  mental  realizations  to  verbal, 
semantic competence. In light of such a spectrum the paper asks ‘What sort of theory 
of linguistic meaning can we derive from Vygotsky’s genetic method of analysis?’ In 
lieu of an answer to this question the paper will test this hypothesis. Vygotsky’s 
theory  of  language  acquisition  allows  for,  though  does  not  pursue,  a  solution  to RIFL (2012) vol.6, n. 2: 161-173 
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Locke’s  paradox,  that  is,  how  to  reconcile  the  hidden  mental  event  of  linguistic 
meaning with the public character of natural language. Such a reconciliation can be 
best achieved, I suggest, by a semantics of imaginability. To demonstrate this claim, I 
offer  a  critical,  though  necessarily  selective,  overview  of  Vygotsky’s  position, 
emphasizing  imaginability  and  resemblance  relations,  Aristotle’s  homoiamata.  I 
suggest that despite a number of grey areas in this respect, Vygotsky appears to me 
to have made a strong case for resemblance relations surviving in linguistic meaning 
at least in some minimal form. Otherwise his ‘concept’ would have to be taken as 
abstracted to ideality or formal emptiness, a reading that would seriously undermine 
Vygotsky’s entire program. Given the limited space of this paper, I will not address 
the ongoing debates in the wake of Vygotsky’s writings in psychology (ROTH AND 
LEE  2007;  ROBBINS  2001;  WERTSCH  1985;  KOZULIN  1990;  BAKHURST 
1986)  in  education,  (DAVYDOV  1995;  Moll  1990),  on  Vygotsky’s  ‘historical-
dialectical monism’ (LIU AND MATTHEWS 2005), or in activity theory and the 
theorization  of  cultural  practices  (SANNINO  et  al.  2009;  COLE  and 
GAJAMASCHKO 2009; ROTH AND LEE 2007). Instead, my focus will be strictly 
on the question of the transformation of nonverbal into verbal thought. 
 
 
2. The social basis of language  
For Vygotsky, our ‘higher psychological functions’, such as language competence, 
are fundamentally social. Their phylogenesis and ontogenesis are social in origin. 
Humans did not develop language as part of the evolution of their ‘bio-type, but 
through the historical development as a social creature’. Collective human life is at 
the  heart  of  Vygotsky’s  perspective  on  language,  allowing  for  both  ‘working 
together’  and  ‘individuation’(1987b:  192).  In  this  picture,  the  dualism  of  nature 
versus nurture is eliminated by absorbing the former in the latter, such that inherited 
innateness is perfectly compatible with what is ‘superorganic, conditioned, that is, 
social’ (1987b: 154f.). Human culture is human nature. Far from being a ‘natural 
form of behaviour’, human thought is ‘determined by a historical-cultural process’. 
As such, the relation between thinking and speaking is ‘not a prerequisite for, but 
rather  a  product  of,  the  historical  development  of  human  consciousness’.  (1991: 
210). Language is above all ‘the social means of thought’ (1991: 94). Importantly, 
Vygotsky’s deeply anchored social gradualism distinguishes his work sharply from 
such other research paradigms as structuralism and analytical accounts.  
So adamant is Vygotsky as to the social, evolutionary character of language that he 
distances himself also from Piaget’s notion of ‘socialized’ speech, ‘as though it had 
been something else before becoming social’ (1991: 35). Instead, Vygotsky prefers 
the term communicative. When the child’s communicative competence is impaired, 
as  in  the  handicapped  child,  the  inadequacy  is  explained  by  Vygotsky  as  an 
‘incongruence  between  his  psychological  structure  and  the  structure  of  cultural 
forms’ (1987b: 47).  The child’s ‘intrapsychological’ categories find it difficult to 
match their social, equivalent, ‘interpsychological’ structures (1987b: 11). This is so 
because a significant part of the child’s evolving intrapsychological structure is ‘the 
dependence of thought on affect’ (1987b: 233). Hence Vygotsky regards the unity of 
affect  and  intellect  as  essential  for  the  development  of  the  ‘dynamic  reasoning 
system’ and a ‘cornerstone’ in developmental research (1987b: 238f.). At the same 
time, he qualifies these observations by making the point that the ‘dependence of 
thought on feeling’ is not a one-sided affair. Nor, he says, are we dealing here with RIFL (2012) vol.6, n. 2: 161-173 
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‘an object’; rather, it is ‘a process’(1987b: 240). In the gradually inward movement, 
emotion ‘escapes peripheral control’(BRUNER 1987: 15). 
Closely related to the relation of affect and thought is Vygotsky’s treatment of the 
will as one of the three fundamental problems his research, the other two being ‘the 
problem of thinking’ and ‘the problem of the imagination’ (1987a: 349; my italics). 
The will is ‘will to meaning’ in the sense that when a child’s associative mental 
scenarios  are  disrupted  he  or  she  is  likely  to  change  the  imaginary  world  by 
‘producing a meaningful rather than meaningless action’ and so accommodates and 
interpretively masters the disturbance (1987a: 356). Will as the will to meaning fails 
at both extremes of the spectrum of ‘maniacal excitement’ over ‘galloping ideas’ on 
the one hand and, on the other, ‘obsessive ideas’ from which the individual cannot 
free herself (1987a: 312). The water shed on the way to full linguistic maturity is 
whether thought remains ‘a slave to the passions, their servant’ or whether thought 
develops to be ‘their master’(1987b: 239).  
 
 
3. The nonverbal ingredients of thought 
When Vygotsky speaks of the heterogeneity of the ‘complex formation’ that is verbal 
thinking, this heterogeneity is to be sought partly in the character of language as a 
temporally unfolding sequence of expressions and partly in the sources from which 
language draws its ‘meaningful aspect’ (1987a: 320). Even if Vygotsky  does not 
spell  this  out  in  full,  the  sources  of  ‘the  concreteness  of  thought’  (1987b:  232)  
appear to involve such heterosemiotic readings of the world as olfactory, gustatory, 
tactile,  visual  and  other  nonverbal  interpretations.  This  is  most  obvious  in  what 
Vygotsky calls the ‘pre-verbal growth’ of the ‘intellect’(1987a: 117). As language 
develops, it ‘involves the filling of what we say  with meaning, the extraction of 
meaning from what we see, hear, and read’(1987a: 320; my italics). If sight, touch, 
smell  and  taste,  as  well  as  other  perceptual  modalities  fill  the  arbitrary  and  so 
meaningless sounds of linguistic expressions, then nonverbal thought is pivotal to 
our  description  of  how  natural  language  works  semantically  and  pragmatically. 
Following Vygotsky, we can neither say that thought can be identified with speech, 
as so many of our semantic theories do, nor that they are absolutely different from 
one another. 
The presence of perception in language is highlighted by Vygotsky when he writes, 
‘we can no longer separate the perception of the object as such from its meaning or 
sense’. Linguistic meaning results from a merging of nonverbal and verbal mental 
states. ‘It is here’, he says, ‘that the connection between perception and speech, the 
connection between perception and the word, arises’(1987a: 299f). If this is so, then 
the  combination  of  perception  and  speech  necessitates  the  transformation  of  the 
nonverbal into the verbal rather than the abandonment of the former. In other words, 
the nonverbal survives in the verbal. The question is in what form it can be argued to 
do so. Since perception itself cannot fulfil the role of meaning in language, we need 
to look at its mental transformation in and as Vorstellung, understood here as ‘mental 
modification  of  perception’(RUTHROF  2010a:  140).  Though  the  ‘first  form  of 
intellectual activity’ in the child is ‘active, practical thinking’, this presupposes the 
very possibility of its generalizing transformation into an imagined world. Although 
‘the child prefers the real apple to the imaginary one’, it is the imagined apple that 
will play the crucial role in linguistic meaning (VYGOTSKY 1987a: 63). 
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For  Vygotsky,  the  imagination  is  ‘a  psychological  system’  anchored  in  the 
‘unification of several functions in unique relationships’(1987a: 348). In particular, 
the ‘imagination is a necessary, integral aspect of realistic thinking’, so much so that 
‘they two act as a unity’(1987a: 349).  In this unity, it makes sense to think that 
language  functions  as  an  economizing  matrix  gradually  imposed  over  nonverbal 
thought. Furthermore, the imagination is essential even for ordinary perception. ‘No 
accurate  cognition  of  reality  is  possible’,  observes  Vygotsky,  ‘without  a  certain 
element  of  imagination,  a  certain  flight  from  the  immediate,  concrete,  solitary 
impressions in which this reality is presented in the elementary act of consciousness’ 
(1987a:  349).  This  commits  Vygotsky  to  a  feed-back  relation  not  only  between 
perception, Vorstellung and conceptualization, Kant’s dialectic between receptivity 
and  spontaneity,  (CPR  A50/B74)  but  also  to  the  necessary  interaction  between 
imaginability and language. The former is an inextricable component of the latter, 
while language lends precision to Vorstellung. Vygotsky’s reasoning in favour of this 
interaction  has  considerable  force:  ‘A  more  profound  penetration  of  reality’,  he 
writes, ‘demands that consciousness attain a freer relationship to the elements of that 
reality, that consciousness depart from the external and apparent aspect of reality that 
is given directly in perception’(1987a: 349). What is important in the transformation 
of perception into Vorstellung and its so modified role in language is what Vygotsky 
calls the ‘perseveration of representation’, the tendency to follow the momentum of a 
once chosen sequence of Vorstellungen (1987a: 311f.). This tendency has the double 
effect of continuity and directionality. It is the latter that language has inherited from 
its  semiotic  precursor  systems,  and  it  is  the  goal  directedness  of  our  mental 
representations  that  make  them  productive  rather  than  merely  reproductive.  As 
Vygotsky says, they are ‘goal determined’(1987a: 124). Pointing preceded speaking 
by a long shot; it reappears in language as its ‘indicative’ function. 
 
 
4. The heterogeneity of the verbal 
If ‘verbal thinking is a complex formation that is heterogeneous in nature’ (1987a: 
320),  and nonverbal thought emerges from a variety of heterosemiotic systems, then 
it should not come as a surprise that, as Vygotsky notes in ‘The Genetic Roots of 
Thought and Speech’, ‘progress in thought and progress in speech are not parallel’. 
Rather, both in phylogeny and ontogeny ‘their two growth curves cross and recross’ 
(1991: 68). Gradually, and as a result of this asymmetrical dialectic between the 
nonverbal and the verbal, ‘thought does not merely find expression in speech; it finds 
its reality and form’ (219; my italics). Both ‘reality’ and ‘form’ emphasize the public 
nature of language in the shape of linguistic signifiers. Yet ‘form’ also points us to 
the  idea  of  ‘conceptual  regulation’  which,  though  mental,  also  partakes  of 
‘publicness’, but in a different sense, a point to be taken up again towards the end of 
the paper. 
Highlighting the heterogeneity of the verbal, Vygotsky argues that in language, ‘the 
semantic  and  phonetic  developmental  processes  are  essentially  one,  precisely 
because  of  their  opposite  directions’(1991:  220).  This  seemingly  paradoxical 
statement alerts us to what one could call the double helix of the interaction between 
the  movement  of  word  absorbing  nonverbal  materials  and  the  movement  from 
nonverbal ‘meaningful complex’ to words that takes place as one integrated process. 
In light of this dynamic complexity in the process of language acquisition, Vygotsky 
feels encouraged to write that ‘words cannot be put on by thought like a ready-made 
garment’(1991:  219).  Of  course,  in  habitual  speech,  this  genetic  complexity  is RIFL (2012) vol.6, n. 2: 161-173 
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replaced by an almost automated and almost instantaneous process, such that the 
word indeed appears to be a ‘ready-made garment’ for thought. As I will argue later, 
it is the ‘linguistic linkage compulsion’ that makes it so. 
Vygotsky’s argument in favour of the heterogeneity of the verbal is supported also 
by obvious differences between Vorstellung and grammar. Psychologically, they are 
not homogeneous, ‘there is no direct correspondence between grammatical form and 
the sense unity it expresses’(1987a: 322). In spite of this, Vygotsky never loses sight 
of the parallels between thought and speech. ‘Not only subject and predicate, but 
their grammatical gender, case, tense, degree, etc., have their psychological doubles’ 
(1991: 221). Verbal heterogeneity, together with its parallels in nonverbal thought, 
makes  Vygotsky’s  theory  an  attractive  explanatory  option.  Although  thought  and 
speech develop ‘along separate lines’, they merge ‘at a certain point’ (1991: 93). The 
same  would  probably  hold  true  for  phylogeny,  except  that  there  the  time  scale 
involved must be vastly different. 
Notions such as the ‘psychological double’ of signifiers, ‘the independent grammar 
of thought’, and the ‘syntax of word meanings’ open the door not only to a semantics 
of  imaginability,  but  also  to  the  tempting  idea  of  a  nonverbal  protosyntax  as  a 
precursor to rudimentary linguistic sequencing in the evolution of natural language. 
(RUTHROF  2010b:  163).  This  line  of  thinking  also  finds  support  in  Vygotsky’s 
remark that ‘the seeds of future reflection –an understanding of justification, proof, 
and  so  on  –  are  already  contained  in  the  most  primitive  of  children’s  quarrels’ 
(1987b:  197).  Both  ontogenetically  and  phylogenetically  we  could  speak  then  of 
protosyntactic  precursors  of  verbal  reasoning.  If  gender,  case,  tense,  subject,  and 
predicate  are  ‘mirrored’  psychologically,  they  must  exist  in  both  verbal  and 
nonverbal forms, even if we take the view that we cannot separate our nonverbal 
realizations from their verbal regulation. Certainly, such ‘mirroring’, if that is what is 
happening, cannot start from the verbal; there must already be a preverbal experience 
of something that can be formed into a subject, a predicate, and so on. Otherwise, 
ostensive  teaching  would  not  work.  The  child  will  recognize  something  as  a 
candidate of a linguistic subject in a simple sentence only if she has already grasped 
that something as an individuated object. Verbal sequences supervene on perceptual 
order. The syntax of language, then, can be viewed as a refinement of a nonverbal 
protosyntax. 
 
 
5. Concept formation from syncretism to external speech 
Vygotsky’s experiments have shown ‘how the use of the word acts as a means of 
forming  the  concept,  how  from  syncretic  images  and  connections,  complexive 
thinking, and potential concepts, there arises that unique signifying structure that we 
may  call  a  concept  in  the  true  sense  of  the  word’  (1987a:  166).  According  to 
Vygotsky,  concept  formation  in  the  child  proceeds  in  three  stages.  Stage  one  is 
characterized by the ‘syncretic image’, a roughly fused heap of objects which are 
gradually ordered in terms of a ‘kinship’ by ‘impressions’ and spatial ‘distributions’ 
until they are reduced to ‘a single meaning’(1987a: 135). At an early stage of the 
child’s development, ‘word meaning is an incompletely defined, unformed, syncretic 
coupling of separate objects’ fused into a mental singularity. Syncretism in this sense 
is  characterized  by  ‘insufficiency  of  objective  connections’  which  are  gradually 
corroborated in social ‘practice’. As such, the child’s ‘syncretic merging of images’ 
corresponds to the adult speaker’s full conceptual control (1987a: 134). RIFL (2012) vol.6, n. 2: 161-173 
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Stage  two  of  concept  formation  opens  with  the  creation  of  ‘family  names’,  an 
empirical  ‘complex  collection’,  ‘chained  complex’,  and  a  ‘familial  unification  of 
things’,  typically  resolved  in  the  end  by  a  ‘pseudoconcept’(1987a:  136ff.).  The 
function  of  the  pseudoconcept  is  the  linking  of  ‘complexive  and  conceptual 
thinking’(1987a: 145). This is possible because the complex already ‘contains the 
kernel  of  the  future  concept  that  is  germinating  within  it’.  (1987a:  146)  The 
nonverbal  core  of  the  unified  complex,  one  could  say,  reappears  transformed  in 
conceptual  schematization  (RUTHROF  2011a).  Yet  as  a  mere  ‘shadow  of  the 
concept’, the pseudoconcept can do no more than reproduce ‘its contours’ (1987a: 
144),  an  idea  reminiscent  of  Kant’s  description  of  schematization  as  general 
‘delineation’  (CPR  A141/B180;  RUTHROF  2011a).  Thus  Vygotsky  views  the 
pseudoconcept , as a transitional phase on the way to the ‘stable and constant word 
meanings’  of  the  adult  speaker.  As  such,  it  is  part  of  the  ‘development  of 
generalizations’ under the guidance of pedagogy (1987a: 143). In this process the 
child is ‘not free to construct his own complexes’. They are ‘ready-made’, the child 
finding them ‘in completed form’ as it begins to understand ‘unfamiliar speech’. The 
‘form of generalization’ at work in the pseudoconcept, however, differs from that 
operative in the ‘true concept’. A series of objects are ‘generalized by a given word’; 
the  child  ‘learns  the  developed  speech  of  the  adults  around  him’.  As  Vygotsky 
insists, ‘Everything is contained in this statement’(1987a: 144f.). Stage three, lastly, 
at the point of the ‘maturation of the word itself’(1987a: 241), is the attainment of 
actual concepts. Although Vygotsky privileges the ‘scientific concept’, in the form of 
the ‘social science concept’, from what he has to say of concept development, we can 
nonetheless glean the following (1987a: 239). 
Amongst  the  kinds  of  concepts  Vygotsky  distinguishes,  the  ‘preconcept’  of  pre-
school age, the ‘pseudoconcept’, the ‘spontaneous concept’, the ‘scientific concept’, 
and the ‘everyday concept’, it is the everyday concepts in the domains of ‘social life’ 
that are the most relevant to the semantics of natural language. Unfortunately he does 
not say very much about them (1987a: 240f.). Nevertheless, his statements about 
scientific  concepts  permit  a  number  of  extrapolations  relevant  to  ‘everyday 
concepts’. Concepts are treated as ‘word meanings’ (1987a: 167; MINNICK 1987: 
24) which function differently  within the domains of everyday life and scientific 
thinking and according to the ‘measure of generality’ as the place they occupy in a 
conceptual system and according to ‘concept equivalence’ or the way concepts relate 
to one another (1987a: 227). The former ‘determines the set of possible operations of 
thought available for a given concept’, whereas the latter determines the ‘paths of 
movement from one concept to the next’ (1987a: 228; 233). Scientific concepts are 
grasped within the coordinates of their respective paradigm of generality rather than 
by the order of perception and Vorstellung. Nevertheless, Vygotsky observes a feed-
back relation between scientific concepts and their everyday equivalents in that the 
practice  of  the  former  produces  an  increase  in  general  conceptual  ‘performance’. 
(1987a:  168).  In  spite  of  this  relation,  Vygotsky  insists  on  the  following  ‘key 
difference in the psychological nature’ of the two: scientific concepts are always part 
of a system, while everyday concepts are not (1987a: 234). This, I think, is a grave 
error in Vygotsky’s picture of concepts, as it is in Saussure’s Cours. It is a mistake to 
assume that the perceptual world and its modification in the Vorstellungswelt should 
be non-systemic. Nothing is more unlikely. The world coheres for us, as it does for 
animals, as a nonverbal system in which heterosemiotic readings together produce an 
intersemiotic  system  of  multiple  coordinates.  It  is  against  the  socially  reinforced 
background of that system that language evolved in the first place and against which RIFL (2012) vol.6, n. 2: 161-173 
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the child, according to Vygotsky’s own description, acquires her concepts. Scientific 
paradigm dependent concepts cannot be taken as the master key for understanding 
concepts in general. The concepts of chemistry in no way illustrate how the olfactory 
concept of the scent of a jasmine blossom emerges and functions, though both are 
systemic rather than random. 
Like concept formation, language acquisition in the broader sense occurs in three 
stages, from egocentric speech, through inner speech to external speech. Egocentric 
speech  in  Vygotsky  is  ‘a  primitive  method  of  children’s  thinking  out  loud  in  a 
difficult situation’ (1987b: 195) and as such ‘fulfils an intellectual function’(1987b: 
194). As a first step in the development of inner speech and as the first ‘autonomous 
speech function’, egocentric speech gradually turns into ‘inner speech’. (1987b: 196) 
Compared  to  external  speech,  inner  speech,  or  ‘endophasy’,  for  Vygotsky  is  a 
‘distinct plane of verbal thought’ (1991: 224; 248) which appears as truncated, ‘a 
dynamic, shifting, unstable thing, fluttering between word and thought’ (1991: 249). 
Other traits of inner speech include a ‘tendency towards predication’, concomitant 
with the frequent omission of the subject of the sentence, which is typically taken for 
granted  (1991:  236).  With  a  condensation  towards  predication  also  comes 
‘decreasing vocalization’ to the degree that ‘inner speech is speech almost without 
words’ (1991: 244). As syntax and word sound recede, meaning as the ‘influx of 
sense’ comes to the fore, so much so that Vygotsky describes it as ‘thinking in pure 
meanings’(1991:  247;  249).  While  in  external  speech  ‘thought  is  embedded  in 
words’, in inner speech ‘words die as they bring forth thought’(1991: 249).  
What makes Vygotsky’s elaboration of the three stages both in concept formation 
and speech forms important for our hypothesis is that it makes it highly unlikely that 
nonverbal thought, so powerfully present throughout the evolution of language in 
childhood,  should  suddenly  dissolve  into  empty  abstractions  at  the  end  of  the 
process. When Vygotsky speaks of the attainment of the ‘true concept’ of which the 
word is the bearer (1987a: 145) we need to know what sort and degree of abstraction 
has been achieved? I will return to this question towards the end of the paper. 
 
 
6. Linguistic meaning 
What  then  does  Vygotsky’s  meaning  consist  of?  The  semantic  realization  of 
language occurs as a mental process of ‘filling’ word sounds with ‘the extraction of 
meaning from what we see, hear, and read’(1987a: 320; my italics). This crucial 
passage  identifies  in  a  nutshell  the  essential  features  of  what  turns  an  arbitrary, 
empty signifier into a motivated signified. According to Vygotsky, the non-semantic 
sound of words and their combination in syntactic strings are semantically activated 
by our nonverbal resources of sight, hearing and, we should add, all other perceptual 
modalities and their modifications in and by Vorstellung. This is why Vygotsky can 
say that ‘a word devoid of thought is a dead thing’ (1991: 255). The  distinction 
between  word  and  thought  remains  sharp  throughout  his  work.  Recalling  the 
situation of having seen ‘a barefoot boy in a blue shirt running down the street’, 
Vygotsky says that he conceived of this ‘in one thought, but I put it into separate 
words’(1991: 251). This justifies his controversial insistence on the word as ‘the 
most elementary form of the unity between thought and word’, which ‘cannot be 
further analysed’ (1991: 212; cf., e.g., ROTH AND LEE 2007; WERTSCH 1985: 
198). 
Because  nonverbal  thought  remains  an  active  component  of  meaning,  speech 
comprehension depends on whether we are able to imagine a portion of a ‘world’ as RIFL (2012) vol.6, n. 2: 161-173 
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a  result  of  hearing  the  sounds  of  linguistic  expressions.  Vice  versa,  in  order  to 
convey our thoughts, verbal and nonverbal, we must find linguistic expressions that 
guide our speech partners to imagine the sort of ‘world’ we want to project. But the 
relationship between thought and word is by no means straightforward. ‘Neither the 
external-verbal nor the semiotic-meaningful aspect of speech appears suddenly in its 
final form’(1987a: 320). The do not ‘move in parallel’, nor is either a ‘copy of the 
other’ (1987a: 320). Rather, they ‘are the reverse of one another’ (1987a: 321). This 
suggests a dialectically dynamic, chiastic structure of word and Vorstellung. Initially, 
Vygotsky observes an opposition between words and their heterosemiotic contents of 
tactile, visual, olfactory and other origins, which gradually approach one another, 
cross over and move apart in the opposite direction, with adult speech characterized 
as an oppositional association of abstracted thought and word sound. If ‘the meaning 
of the word is a generalization’ (1987a: 238) and the evolution of verbal meaning is a 
‘generalization’ of previous generalizations’ (1987a: 229), then once more the nature 
and degree of abstraction involved becomes an urgent issue to address, as does the 
relation between Vygotsky’s dynamic conception of meaning and the assumption of 
its immutability in definitional semantics. 
Like  Peirce,  Vygotsky  emphasizes  the  evolving  character  of  meaning. 
Ontogenetically, ‘the meaning of the child’s word develops’(1987a: 322). Much the 
same  can  be  said  from  a  phylogenetic  perspective.  In  either  case,  semantic 
development is to be associated with ‘the intellectualization of the mental functions’ 
(1987a: 324). In opposition to describing linguistic meaning by way of ‘definition’, 
Vygotsky points us away from the inevitable infinite regress inherent in definitional 
approaches and towards the heterosemiotic ground that makes word sounds semantic. 
‘A major deficiency of the method of definition’, Vygotsky notes, ‘is that the concept 
is torn from its natural connections’ (1987a: 123). This remark contains a profound 
critique of an entire paradigm of semantics. Definitions only work if we already have 
semantic mastery over a significant portion of their ‘as-structure’, which begs the 
very question of meaning. So we should jettison semantic explications via verbal 
substitutions and instead argue for links between word sounds and nonverbal mental 
scenarios.    ‘A  word’,  he  says,  ‘acquires  its  sense  from  the  context  in  which  it 
appears; in different contexts it changes its sense. Meaning remains stable throughout 
the changes of sense’(1991: 245). The ‘stability’ of meaning in Vygotsky’s sense of 
‘meaning’ as provided in the dictionary is of course not semantic at all. Only in a 
metaphorical sense can the dictionary meaning be called ‘a stone in the edifice of 
sense’(1991:  245).  After  all,  without  the  ‘filling’  of  linguistic  expressions  by 
nonverbal, mental materials it is nothing but a syntactic relation between two sound 
sequences. To be sure, there remains a tension in Vygotsky’s account between the 
emergence of ‘the connection between thought and word’ and its consolidation in the 
adult native speaker where we are dealing with ‘stable and constant word meanings’ 
(1987a:143;  my  italics).  On  the  one  hand,  we  cannot  assume  any  semantic 
immutability because ‘word meanings develop’(1991: 212), and because ‘new word 
meanings’ facilitate ‘new paths from thought to word’ (1991: 251) and also because 
‘there is no rigid correspondence between the units of thought and speech’ (1991: 
249). On the other hand, at the end of the long process of language acquisition, 
Vygotsky  stabilizes  meaning  as  ‘a  generalized  reflection  of  reality’  semantically 
informing  ’the  basic  character  of  words’(1991:  255).  This  leaves  us  with  the 
following issues still to be clarified. 
One  is  how  precisely  nonverbal  materials  can  be  generalized  to  suit  linguistic 
meaning;  the  other,  how  nonverbal  mental  states  can  be  aligned  with  public RIFL (2012) vol.6, n. 2: 161-173 
DOI 10.4396/20120713 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
169 
 
discourse.  When  Vygotsky  speaks  of  the  generalization  that  nonverbal  materials 
undergo in the process of intellectualization, this must not be understood as a process 
of  formalization,  which  would  mean  the  elimination  of  nonverbal  content  from 
language. Instead, ‘the verbal character of thought is inherent to both imagination 
and  realistic  thinking’  and  ‘both  imagination  and  realistic  thinking  are  often 
characterized by a high degree of affect and emotion’ (1987a: 348). Nonetheless, 
what is missing in Vygotsky is an argument in favour of the kind of schematization 
that  we  must  stipulate  nonverbal  mental  materials  undergo  to  fit  the  bill  of 
intellectualized verbal thought which he sees as the end point of language acquisition 
in the child.  
As  to  Vygotsky’s  formulation  of  ‘Locke’s  dilemma’,  that  ‘direct  communication 
between minds is impossible’ and that ‘communication can be achieved only in a 
roundabout way’, this points to a pivotal disagreement in the struggle over semantics 
in  linguistics  and  the  philosophy  of  language  (1991:  252).  Because  of  the 
simultaneous external and internal mediation of thought by signs, Vygotsky cannot 
but commit himself to ‘study the inner workings of thought and speech, hidden from 
direct observation’(1991: 252; 254). Yet it is precisely because of the hidden nature 
of thought that an entire tradition from Frege to this day has rejected the Lockean 
path of mental resemblance relations and instead opted for externalist explanations. 
In  opposition  to  semantic  externalism  and  in  support  of  Vygotsky’s  position,  a 
solution to Locke’s paradox can be found in an argument for the indirectly public 
nature of linguistic meaning. Accordingly, native speakers can be defined as persons 
that  have  been  trained  to  activate  Vorstellung  within  the  strict  constraints  of  the 
speech community under the rules of sufficient semiosis (RUTHROF 1997: 48f.) and 
the linguistic linkage compulsion (RUTHROF 2011c: 168). This allows us to argue 
the reconciliation of public signifiers with indirectly public signifiers in the social 
production of meaning without either having to defend semantic privacy or opt for an 
untenable externalism.  
The  non-reductive  transformation  of  thought  into  its  abstracted  verbal  form  is 
implicated also when Vygotsky speaks of the ‘plane’ of ‘thought itself’ as the ‘last 
step  in  our  analysis’(1991:  249;  252).  It  is  at  this  point  that  such  diametrically 
opposed research enterprises as Vygotsky’s and Donald Davidson’s all of a sudden 
appear to meet one another. Toward the end of his career, Davidson surprises his 
readers by saying that ‘truth thus rests in the end on belief and, even more ultimately, 
on  the  affective  attitudes’  (2005:  75;  my  italics).  Similarly,  towards  the  end  of 
Thought and Language, Vygotsky writes that thought cannot be separated out from 
our ‘desires and needs, our interests and emotions’ since ‘behind every thought there 
is an affective-volitional tendency, which holds the answer to the last ”why” in the 
analysis  of  thinking’  (1991:  252;  my  italics).  Without  grasping  the  affective 
motivation  underlying  the  words  of  speakers  we  cannot  fully  understand  their 
speech. 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
In spite of Vygotsky’s focus on the acquisition of language in childhood, the paper 
has  gleaned  from  his  Collected  Works  what  appear  to  be  essential  features  of 
linguistic meaning in the adult native speaker. I sum these up as follows.  
·  Linguistic meaning is a generalized nonverbal complex in the unification of 
thought and word sound. RIFL (2012) vol.6, n. 2: 161-173 
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·  Thought consists of nonverbal materials and their abstraction in language. 
·  The combination of thought and word takes place in the minds of the speakers 
of a natural language. 
·  This mental event occurs under the guidance of the speech community and so 
is fundamentally social. 
·  Nonverbal  materials  include  perceptual  contents  and  their  productive 
modifications in and as Vorstellung. 
·  Given their heterogeneous sources, such mental contents are heterosemiotic. 
·  As such they are homogenized into general concepts in linguistic meanings. 
·  In linguistic meaning, the initial dominance of nonverbal thought over words 
is reversed such that generalized verbal meanings govern those contents. 
By offering ‘an ontogenetic progression from “unorganized heaps” to “complexes” 
and  then  to  “concepts”  on  the  basis  of  block-sorting’  (WERTSCH  1985:  100), 
Vygotsky  leaves  the  door  open  to  a  semantics  of  imaginability.  From  such  a 
perspective  I  propose  the  following  amendments  to  Vygotsky’s  theorization. 
Generalization cannot be formal. If it were, then we would have lost the very content 
he insists is essential to meaning. Nor can it be ideal in the way the early Husserl 
argued,  since  ideality  can  be  demonstrated  only  by  recourse  to  formal  relations. 
Generalization, then, seems to be best conceived as a schematization on a scale from 
the rich retention of mental, iconic materials to their minimal resemblance, without 
however ever completely losing all traces of quasi-perceptual content. 
Vygotsky’s concept as a socially guided, abstracting, regulatory mechanism and its 
result  answers  the  questions  of  what  is  so  regulated:  nonverbal  mental  states, 
comprising olfactory, gustatory, tactile, aural, visual and other perceptual readings 
and their modifications in Vorstellung. He does not however specify how the concept 
accomplishes its regulatory task. I suggest that conceptual regulation is a process of 
ordering  mental  iconic  materials  in  terms  of  directionality,  quality,  quantity,  and 
degree of schematization. Given this kind of specification of the concept and in light 
of Vygotsky’s position on the role of nonverbal thought and its transformation in 
linguistic meaning, I suggest that my initial hypothesis concerning the compatibility 
of Vygotsky’s enterprise with a semantics of imaginability appears to be confirmed 
to a significant degree. Accordingly, his theorisation should be commensurate with 
the  description  of  linguistic  meaning  as  ‘the  activation  under  the  control  of  the 
speech community of arbitrary word sounds, or signifiers, by motivated signifieds 
made  up  of  nonverbal,  iconic,  mental  materials  regulated  as  quasi-perceptual 
abstractions by concepts according to directionality, quality, quantity, and degree of 
schematization’.  If  so,  natural  language  can  be  conceived  as  ‘a  set  of  social 
instructions for imagining, and acting in, a world’. 
This, at the same time, entails a solution to Locke’s paradox which Vygotsky has 
inherited, namely of how to reconcile hidden mental states and public speech. As 
native speakers, we have been trained to associate Vorstellung and word sound in a 
precise fashion according to the linguistic linkage compulsion. At the moment of 
comprehension of a word sound our mental states are not in free play but appear 
automated  according  to  rigorous  social  standards.  In  addition,  linguistic  meaning 
occurs under the broader pedagogic umbrella of sufficient semiosis, which includes 
the phonetic, grammatical, generic, idiomatic and modal constraints that the speech 
community has evolved to secure effective communication. In habitual speech these RIFL (2012) vol.6, n. 2: 161-173 
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constraints  are  rigid,  in  the  interpretive  use  of  language  they  flex  according  to 
occasion and need. As a component of linguistic meaning, Vygotsky’s abstracted, 
nonverbal thought, then, can be regarded as indirectly public. 
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